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Abstract At present, there are different attempts to establish
quality criteria for foresight based on both, the epistemic and
the procedural level and all these attempts contribute to a
scientific discourse on foresight. But how can we evaluate
whether these criteria are scientifically valid themselves and
whether they correspond to a form of scientific criticism that is
appropriate for foresight validation? This paper introduces
exemplarily social epistemology as an underpinning theory
for foresight validation by quality criteria. This is shown by
the example of the foresight quality criteria developed by
Kuusi, Cuhls and Steinmüller [12] in this Topical Collection,
which are put in line with Helen Longino’s concept of trans-
formative criticism. Longino has been chosen because her
theory includes the consideration of contextual values in dis-
cussions of scientific objectivity and provides concrete criteria
of transformative criticism. This paper is a major contribution
to underpinning foresight by social epistemology and to vali-
dating quality criteria by a comprehensive form of scientific
criticism, which takes the scientific interdisciplinary nature of
foresight into account.
Keywords Foresight . Quality criteria . Validation .
Epistemology .Social epistemology .Transformativecriticism
Introduction
It is often emphasized that foresight, and futures studies in
general, are located between the arts and science (e.g., [1,
2]). This statement is justified by the methodological variety
of foresight, the different fields and topics which can be ap-
plied as well as the interdisciplinary nature of foresight project
teams and the involved stakeholders [3–5]. Hence, foresight
processes are most balanced when different quantitative and
qualitative methods are combined and the process includes
heterogeneous teams and expert groups (see [6, 7]). At
present, there are different attempts to establish quality
criteria for foresight based on both, the epistemic and the
procedural level [8–12] and all these attempts contribute to
a scientific discourse on foresight. Kuusi, Cuhls and
Steinmüller [12] for example elaborate quality criteria for
the internal, procedural level but also on an external level
questioning the quality of the outcomes concerning the cus-
tomers’ interests. Concerning criteria that question the
quality of foresight, it is important to note that these criteria
ought to classify if foresight is pursued in a scientific way.
This means that based on specific criteria foresight fulfills
the requirements of a scientific method. Obviously, there is
a need to set up criteria in order to distinguish the quality of
foresight in terms of scientific procedures, but also the
quality in terms of outcomes. But how can we evaluate
whether these criteria are scientifically valid themselves
and whether they correspond to a form of scientific criti-
cism that is appropriate to foresight validation?
For this purpose, it may be expedient to apply modern
philosophical theories emphasizing the social aspect of
knowledge creation in foresight. For example, in recent years
philosophers have often supported the position that science
has to be pluralistic or social in order to meet an acceptable
level of credibility [13–15]. Nowadays, this kind of
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philosophical research on the social dimension of knowledge
is known as social epistemology [16]. It either examines social
practices in terms of their impact on knowledge acquisition or
on rationality [17]. According to Goldman, knowledge is de-
fined as true belief derived by appropriate knowledge-
producing methods which are either internal (including per-
ception, memory, reasoning) or external (including testimony
and discourses of others) [17]. In contrast to classical episte-
mology, social epistemology focuses on the latter point, that
is, on Bepistemic agents that influence the beliefs of each^
[17]. In fact, in philosophy of science knowledge per se is
discussed widely and controversially [18] – yet, the socio-
epistemic approach is most appealing to contemporary sci-
ence, as it sets up epistemic criteria that embrace the social
and interdisciplinary character of knowledge creation in sci-
ence. The American philosopher Helen Longino [13] for ex-
ample has elaborated a concept of transformative criticism
which takes values and external knowledge-producing
methods and their interdisciplinary nature into account.
The interdisciplinary nature of producing knowledge in
foresight can be seen as a typical example where external
knowledge-producing methods have a major impact. In relat-
ed work, interdisciplinary itself has often been discussed in the
context of futures, research program evaluation and decision
making processes [19–22]. Hence, the knowledge base of
such activities, especially in the field of foresight, has never
been evaluated by considering the socio-epistemic approach,
which seems to be promising due to its emphasis on the social
aspect of scientific knowledge.
The aim of this paper is to discuss whether certain foresight
quality criteria fulfill the requirements of transformative criti-
cism in order to reveal the potentials of social epistemology
for foresight epistemology. As it introduces a first attempt on
how to bridge foresight and epistemology by a socio-
epistemic approach, it focuses only on one comparative ex-
ample. Thus, it provides epistemic reflections and insights into
a new possible concept for scientific criticism of foresight
quality criteria.
The main hypothesis of this paper is that socio-epistemic
underpinning may contribute to validate if foresight quality
criteria are suitable as a tool for scientific criticism of fore-
sight. For this purpose, it is crucial to define the aim of fore-
sight and the way it is pursued (BWhat is scientific
practice?^section). While BThe complexity of epistemic con-
siderations and aims of foresight^ section summarizes the
complexity of epistemic considerations and aims of foresight,
BScientific methodology with regard to Longino’s social
epistemology^ section concentrates on scientific methodolo-
gy, mainly by referring to Longino’s concept of social episte-
mology. In the third section, the quality criteria for foresight as
developed by Kuusi, Cuhls and Steinmüller [12] will be
discussed in the light of the set of socio-epistemic criteria by
using Longino’s theory. The results will be discussed in regard
to their significance for possible theory building and valida-
tion in foresight in BDiscussing relations: quality criteria, ob-
jectivity and relevance^ section. Thereby, it is described how
foresight can be understood as a socio-epistemic approach,
when evaluated by appropriate quality criteria.
What is scientific practice?
Philosophy of science is full of investigations and discussions
on scientific practice. In the last century, the positivists, in-
cluding logical positivists and logical empirists, have been the
most influential, followed by post-postivists or wholists and
more recently by scientific realists, critical rationalists and
pragmatists [13, 23, 24]. Eventually, as Chalmers claims
B[…] there is no general account of science and scientific
method to be had that applies to all sciences at all historical
stages in their development^ [23]. This conclusion is especial-
ly due to the fact that besides the different scientific method-
ologies to approach scientific inquiries, different aims are also
pursued. For example, even though new experimentalists con-
tributed a lot to experimental reasoning in the last century, the
naturalist account, which is paramount to physical and biolog-
ical sciences, cannot be transferred to other sciences, as exper-
imental manipulation is irrelevant for disciplines like social or
historical sciences.1 In short, for epistemic considerations, sci-
entific practice can be defined on two levels: firstly, regarding
scientific methodology; and secondly, regarding scientific
aims. Scientific methods can be referred to as positivist (also
logical empiricist) approaches relying on empirical evidence
or wholist approaches, which are rather theory-laden [13].
Concerning the aims of science, again two main conceptions
can be distinguished: The one position sees the Bconstruction
of comprehensive accounts of the natural world^ [13] as the
main goal of scientific inquiry. Representatives of the other
position claim that Bthe work of science is the discovery of the
truth about the natural world^ [13] – although being skeptical
about the possibilities of reaching this aim. Hence, the former
aims at knowledge extension while the latter aims at finding
truth by scientific inquiry. Thus, the choice of methodology
1 In the last century, investigations in philosophy of science have primar-
ily questioned scientific practice in natural sciences. This caused dispar-
ities in the general perception of the scientific validity of the exact and
inexact sciences, which Helmer and Rescher for example define as fol-
lows: BThe purpose of all sciences is to explain past events and to predict
future events, and to do so in an objective manner. While in the exact
sciences explanation and prediction have the same logical structure, this is
not so in the inexact sciences. […] In an inexact science, conversely,
reasoning is informal; in particular, some of the terminology may, without
actually impeding communication, exhibit some inherent vagueness
[…]^ [41]. For a comprehensive inquiry of scientific methodology, e.g.,
on natural sciences see Chalmers [23] and on social sciences Flick [42]
but also the part on evidential and conceptual criticism in BScientific
methodology with regard to Longino’s social epistemology^ section.
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does not imply a certain aim. But theory and methodology
choice differs even within scientific disciplines, as different
paradigms may be pursued. This is especially due to the social
impact on science, e.g., values and personal preferences
[25, 26].
In her 1990 publication Science as Social Knowledge, the
American philosopher Longino [13] analyzes different aspects
of scientific reasoning in order to show the impact of social
values on scientific research [13]. Her inquiry considers the
main accounts of scientific knowledge, for the sake of brevity,
reduced to positivist and wholist approaches. For describing
scientific inquiry as social epistemology, she questions the
shortcomings of the existing forms of scientific criticism by
showing the importance of constitutive and contextual values
in scientific inquiry as well as the inability of existing forms of
criticism to take them completely into account. Therefore her
theory can be seen as a socio-epistemic one [27]. A core issue of
her inquiry is the constitution of scientific objectivity by con-
sidering these different forms of values. To handle this issue,
she proposes different criteria for transformative criticism. As I
will show in BScientific methodology with regard to Longino’s
social epistemology^ and BA socio-epistemic discussion of
foresight quality criteria^ sections, these constitutive and con-
textual values as well as transformative criticism, may contrib-
ute to a better understanding of foresight quality criteria as a
contribution to fostering a scientific debate on foresight theory.
The complexity of epistemic considerations and aims
of foresight
In the field of foresight and futures studies in general, there are
different approaches, which tangle epistemic considerations.
For example, Mannermaa characterizes different foresight
paradigms [28] and Aligica discusses different accounts of
scientific criticism in the context of futures knowledge [29,
30] while Grunwald considers options for its argumentative
validation [31, 32]. But mostly, foresight is described as a field
which supposedly belongs to the social sciences [33, 34].
Fuller and Loogma [35] even discuss foresight as a social
constructivist endeavor. Wendell Bell, who describes futures
studies as a B[…] transdiciplinary action and social science^
[1], provides a comprehensive link between critical rational-
ism and foresight epistemology. Bell’s definition of critical
rationalism involves accounts of scientific realism as well as
logical empiricism [1]. Further, he sums up the epistemol-
ogies, which underlie the different approaches used in fore-
sight as follows: BFuturists focus on the transformation of
hindsight into foresight. On the one hand, they speculate,
think laterally, intuit, reason counterfactually as well as factu-
ally, cogitate linearly and dialectically, entertain outrageous–
and even despised – notions, and creatively invent in order to
unveil possible and probable futures. On the other hand, they
specify past and present data using a multitude of standard and
special methods, collecting, analyzing, and interpreting evi-
dence in order to make posits about possible and probable
futures and to construct surrogate knowledge as reliably and
validly as they can.^ [1] By this definition, which contains
methodologies of various sciences, Bell tries to encompass a
futures epistemology within the concept of critical realism.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the impact of the so-
cial is also taken into consideration in epistemic discussions of
foresight (see also [36]). Bell also emphasizes social biases
that may threaten validity as a characteristic point when de-
scribing the features of scientific realism [1]. In the second
volume of Foundations of Futures Studies he even claims that
B[t]he critical realist theory of knowledge can incorporate the
testing of value propositions just as it tests truth claims about
the past and the present.^ [37] As will be shown in the next
chapters, Longino’s theory provides even better indications to
support the claim that there is an epistemic base connecting
objectivity, social aspects and values.
But a closer look at different descriptions of the aims of
foresight reveals how important the issue of social aspects
really is in foresight and especially in its validation. Following
Slaughter, foresight can generally be defined as: Bopening to
the future with every means at our disposal, developing views
of future options, and then choosing between them.^ [38] Ac-
cordingly, Bell claims that B[t]he purposes of the futures stud-
ies are to discover or invent, examine or evaluate, and propose
possible, probable and preferable futures.^ [1] Besides these
partly stretched definitions, in their recent paper Kuusi, Cuhls
and Steinmüller also indicate different levels of purposes in
futures research [12]. In general, they also correspond to the
critical realist view of science. For example, in the previous
version of that paper, they propose to consider future know-
ledge as well-justified:
BAccording to the conventional definition, knowledge
about a topic is justified true belief concerning the topic.
Because there is no way to directly ascertain the truth of
an anticipation before its defined realization time, the
knowledge concerning possible futures can be nothing
else than well-justified or well-argued beliefs.^ [11].
But there is not only a scientific aim inherent to futures
studies. Kuusi, Cuhls and Steinmüller emphasize the follow-
ing two challenges for the validation of futures research,
which also underline the aim of foresight:
BDoes the ‘whole picture’ meet scientific criteria? […]
Does the ‘whole picture’ serve their [the customers’ or
the target group of users’] interests? Is it relevant for
them?^ [12]
These two points show the special characteristics of fore-
sight: it is not only expected that foresight practices and
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outcomes correspond to scientific practices, but also that they
fulfill certain aims given by a client or customer. In order to
establishing foresight quality criteria encompassing (1) the
aims of foresight, (2) the goals of foresight projects and (3)
the variety of scientific backgrounds involved, there are two
dimensions to be considered: On the one hand, the crucial
scientific challenges for foresight are the scientific criteria
and the target groups. On the other hand, Longino’s statement
according to which scientific activities can be evaluated with
respect to both goals, knowledge extension as well as finding
truth [13]. Hence, it is crucial to clearly distinguish that the
classical aims of science cannot be applied directly to fore-
sight. This also implies that scientific criticism of foresight
needs its own criteria and rules satisfying the aims and
methods of foresight.
Scientific methodology with regard to Longino’s social
epistemology
Regardless of the perception of the aims of science or the
method used, a crucial characteristic of all forms of scientific
inquiry is objectivity. The claim of objectivity responds to the
idea that science should rely upon facts rather than wishes.
Science can provide two different forms of objectivity. Firstly,
B[…] objectivity is bound up with questions about the truth
and referential character of scientific theories, that is, with
issues of scientific realism^ and secondly, B[…] objectivity
has to do with the forms of inquiry.^ [13] This means that
while the first notion of objectivity refers to objectivity in
terms of describing the natural world as it is, the second one
relies on non-subjective criteria for developing, accepting, and
rejecting the hypotheses and theories constituting a certain
point of view [13]. By ascribing objectivity to a scientific
method, two main points are intended: Firstly, by asserting
the objectivity of data, relying upon them justifies theories
and hypothesis, which are inducted. Secondly, while
confirming or rejecting that a method is objective, we also
evaluate if the methods are the proper means for an unbiased
and unprejudiced assessment of hypotheses and theories [13].
Based on these observations, it is possible to define what a
scientific method is and which scientific methods foresight
consists of. A general definition supported by classical philo-
sophical accounts is that B[…] method, the process by which
knowledge is produced, is the application of rules to data.^
[13] But how are these rules applied? To answer this question,
a closer look at application, process, and rules is necessary.
The application of scientific methods can be summarized
as Bactivities of scientific inquiry ,^ consisting of (1) producing
theories, (2) producing concrete interactions with natural pro-
cesses, or (3) producing models of it [13, 23].
By taking a closer look at this point, it becomes
obvious that the way of conducting science cannot be
abstracted from the people conducting it, meaning the
process per se. As Longino points out, B[t]he integration
and transformation of these activities into a coherent
understanding of a given phenomenon are a matter of
social negotiations.^ [13] These definitions of applica-
tion and process can also be applied to foresight. The
Bgiven phenomenon^ Longino mentions may also be a
future state or a future scenario that is developed. But
foresight does not aim at constructing a Bcoherent un-
derstanding^ about the future. Instead, Longino’s notion
on Bcoherent understanding^ can be applied to the dis-
cursive process of establishing quality criteria in fore-
sight. The former quotation also emphasizes that the
Bnature of scientific inquiry^ [13] is a social one char-
acterized by the following three issues:
& Scientific disciplines are social enterprises, Bthe individual
members of which are dependent on one another for the
conditions (ideas, instruments, et cetera) under which they
practice.^
& Binitiation into scientific inquiry requires education^
& B[A]s the practitioners of the sciences all together consti-
tute a network of communities embedded in a society, the
sciences are also among a society’s activities and depend
for their survival on that society’s valuing what they do.^
In this regard, the scientific community has to fulfill
certain criteria, or rather, follow certain rules for pro-
ducing objective scientific knowledge. This raises the
question how objectivity is reached if science is social?
According to Longino, B[a] method of inquiry is objec-
tive to the degree that it permits transformative criti-
cism.^ By maintaining a critical dialogue, objectivity
grows by degree. Longino makes this point explicit by
going beyond the classical forms of criticizing hypoth-
eses in science, which are evidential and contextual crit-
icism, and introducing transformative criticism as the
outcome of intersubjective criticism. Defining evidential
and contextual criticism first, and then showing how
Longino induces transformative criticism can explain
this best.
Evidential and conceptual criticism
Evidential criticism proceeds Bon the basis of experimental
and observational concerns^ [13]. It questions Bthe accu-
racy, extent and conditions of performance of the experi-
ments and observations serving as evidence, and ques-
tions their analysis and reporting.^ [13] This form of crit-
icism underlines why foresight is often claimed to be un-
scientific. The analysis and reporting can be applied to a
foresight process only with restrictions as results pro-
duced in foresight, e.g., future scenarios, can hardly be
repeated – and are not even intended to be.
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Conceptual criticism proceeds on Bthe basis of theoretical
and meta-theoretical concerns^. Here, three types of
questioning can be distinguished [13]:
& Questioning the conceptual soundness of a hypothesis:
Longino gives as an example Kant criticizing and
questioning the Newtonian hypothesis of absolute time
and space.
& Questioning the consistency of a hypothesis with accepted
theory: such as e.g. traditionalists who rejected the helio-
centric theory as being inconsistent with the existing Ar-
istotelian concept of physics.
& Questioning the relevance of evidence presented in sup-
port of a hypothesis: Such a criticism is related to eviden-
tial criticism, yet, it questions not only data but also why
certain assumptions were taken into consideration as giv-
ing evidence to a hypothesis. What matters is the rele-
vance of certain evidence to a hypothesis. Here, criticism
becomes intersubjective. Bell’s concept of critical ratio-
nalism, which is mentioned in 2.1, can be ascribed to this
form of criticism.
As objectivity in the positivist understanding is limited to
rejecting or accepting hypotheses based on observational and
experimental data, it is only applicable to empirical scientific
inquiry. This is conducted e.g., by Bsyntactically and deduc-
tively secured relation of hypotheses to a stable set of obser-
vational data^ [13]. From a contextual perspective, the proof
of evidential objectivity is insufficient as it does not control if
and which background assumptions lead to strengthen certain
hypotheses. The impact of this consideration on the objectiv-
ity of scientific methods is formulated by Longino as follows:
BBecause the relation between hypotheses and evidence is
mediated by background assumptions that themselves may
not be subject to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation,
and that may be infused with metaphysical or normative con-
siderations, it would be a mistake to identify the objectivity of
scientific methods with their empirical features alone.^ [13]
Longino extends the last point of conceptual criticism in
order to describe that this last form of criticism is transforma-
tive. By doing so she aims at showing that this third type of
conceptual criticism reveals the impact of background beliefs.
The fact that there is such kind of criticism already reveals that
background beliefs and assumptions do have an influence on
the creation of knowledge and therefore objectivity is to be
questioned. As Longino points out:
BObjectivity in the sense under discussion requires a
way to block the influence of subjective preference at
the level of background beliefs. While the possibility of
criticism does not totally eliminate subjective preference
either from an individual’s or from a community’s prac-
tice of science, it does provide a means for checking its
influence in the formation of Bscientific knowledge^
[13].
It seems that as long as background beliefs concerning a
hypothesis are discussed, rejected or altered in the context of
criticism by a scientific community, it is possible to establish
hypotheses as scientific knowledge free from preferences of
any individual. Consequently, scientific knowledge can be
defined as social knowledge. Nevertheless, it is important to
keep in mind that values still enter scientific debates by indi-
vidual’s values, but also by community values [13]. The next
two sections will therefore describe (1) criteria of transforma-
tive criticism and (2) types of contextual values influencing
and shaping knowledge.
Objectivity by criteria of transformative criticism
In order to describe how certain degrees of objectivity can still
be reached, Longino has formulated Bfour criteria necessary
for achieving the transformative dimension of critical dis-
course^ [13, 14]. The transformative dimension of criticism
is the nucleus of intersubjective criticism. The criteria are:
1. Recognized avenues for criticism: The most prominent
form are peer review processes in scientific publishing.
Also, journals and conferences are established avenues
for presenting and criticizing scientific outcomes. These
procedures help to shape and advance scientific knowl-
edge. Longino claims that critical activities should receive
nearly equal weight to Boriginal research^ in order to lead
to valid and objective scientific knowledge. [13]
2. Shared Standards: If criticism ought to be relevant for a
scientific discussion, it should also appeal to Bpublic stan-
dards or criteria to which members of the scientific com-
munity are or feel themselves bound. These standards can
include both substantive principles and epistemic as well
as social values.^Of course, scientific communities differ.
The standards can therefore consist of elements like B[…]
empirical adequacy, truth, generation of specifiable inter-
actions with the natural or experienced world, the expan-
sion of existing knowledge frameworks, consistency with
accepted theories in other domains, comprehensiveness,
reliability as a guide to action, relevance to or satisfaction
of particular social needs.^ [13] Longino emphasizes that
the weighting of the several standards varies not only
from one scientific community to another, but also due
to different social and historical contexts.
3. Community Response: BThis criterion requires that the
beliefs of the scientific community as a whole and over
time change in response to the critical discussion taking
place within it.^ [13] The indicators for responsiveness
are for example contents of textbooks, grants and awards.
Critical discussions and responses can help to enhance
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understandings and assumptions that are guiding for the
community.
4. Equality of intellectual authority: The last criterion refers
to the possibility to B[…] disqualify a community in
which a set of assumptions dominates by virtue of the
political power of its adherents.^
Individuals take part in this scheme by participating in var-
ious critical discussions. All in all, these criteria for transfor-
mative criticism enable the evaluation of the objectivity of
scientific inquiry itself, but also of scientific debates in society.
This is achieved by the fact that at this point, background
beliefs involved in science can be detected and discussed ac-
tively. Further, a contextual view of science goes beyond the
limits of only applying evidential criticism, as it respects the
diversity of scientific methods, and it reacts to the current
practice of science but also to history. [13]
Types of contextual values influencing and shaping knowledge
Longino resumes that for the validation of sciences, both have
to be considered:
1. B[…] the role of background assumptions in evidential
reasoning^
2. B[…] the roles of (sometimes) conflicting goals of inquiry
with respect to which hypotheses and theories are
assessed.^ [13]
The transformative criticism in a scientific communi-
ty including the four criteria as described above helps to
validate scientific inquiries and methods by involving
both, the individual and social values that influence
background assumptions and science. This is important
to keep in mind as contextual values, interests and
value-laden assumptions influence and shape not only
scientific practice but also the results, even when con-
stitutive rules of science are not violated [13]. In other
words, it is possible that a certain scientific process is
valid in terms of evidential criticism, but it may never-
theless violate scientific objectivity regarding contextual
values. The latter can be validated by criteria of trans-
formative criticism.
According to Longino, the practice of both pure and ap-
plied science can be affected and influenced by contextual
values in different ways. Nevertheless, it is possible to pro-
duce good scientific knowledge when taking into account
which of the contextual values might affect our research.
Longino therefore sums up a list of five ways in which con-
textual values might affect our research from the outside [13]:
1. Practices. Contextual values can affect practices that bear
on the integrity of science.
2. Questions. Contextual values can determine which ques-
tions are asked and which are ignored about a given
phenomenon.
3. Data. Contextual values can affect the description of data,
that is, value-laden terms may be employed in the descrip-
tion of experimental or observational data, and values
may influence the selection of data or of kinds of phenom-
ena to be investigated.
4. Specific assumptions. Contextual values can be expressed
in or motivate the background assumptions facilitating
inferences in specific areas of inquiry.
5. Global assumptions. Contextual values can be expressed
in or motivate the acceptance of a global framework like
assumptions that determine the character of research in an
entire field.
These 5 ways help to recognize to which extent the re-
search is affected and to give more emphasis to criticism as
for example the intersubjective one. By doing so, it is possible
to minimize the contextual values, which might lead to biased
results and value-laden assumptions. Although discussing
these points may lead to more clarification, e.g., in order to
validate specific research programs, Longino acknowledges
that even intersubjective criticism is only partially an effective
barrier [13]. One remaining problem is for example that those
value-laden assumptions shared by a whole scientific commu-
nity may remain hidden. Obviously, when applying the differ-
ent forms of criticism, it might appear that intersubjective
criticism of processes and outcomes in the field of foresight
may be most appropriate. Hence, quality criteria shall also
encompass all the different forms of scientific criticism in
order to reveal the quality of foresight procedures and
outcomes.
A socio-epistemic discussion of foresight quality
criteria
In terms of scientific inquiry and based on the aims of inquiry
in foresight itself, foresight cannot be clearly assigned to any
of the predominant scientific disciplines. However, the aim of
foresight per se has an impact on certain groups or is even set
by them, e.g., companies, societies, or nation states. Further,
the applications and processes are usually used and developed
by scholars of different disciplines. So in foresight the aim
already reveals its social character, while in other scientific
disciplines we cannot reveal that it is social until focusing on
the application of rules.
Nevertheless, we are able to fragment foresight processes
in order to evaluate their scientific quality by assessing if we
can validate it. By doing so, we may examine if the foresight
exercise fulfils criteria of scientific objectivity on a socio-
epistemic level. Longino’s theory helps us because she does
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not formulate specific criteria of quality of science that have to
be fulfilled by each discipline. Instead, she explains how plu-
ralism in science is enabled and how a scientific community
produces valid and objective science regarding specific
criteria. This means, that each scientific community sets its
own criteria due to the aims and application of methods. If
we want to ensure valid scientific knowledge by foresight
outcomes, we need to refer to standards that consist of ele-
ments that correspond to the scientific methods of foresight.
Transformative criticism, therefore, may be the appropriate
form for validating foresight outcomes, as it allows
encompassing the special social character of aims and pro-
cesses in foresight. In recent years, some concepts for quality
criteria have been introduced to foresight by different actors of
the foresight community, e.g., [8, 9, 39]. The criticism criteria
for the objectivity of science given in the previous chapter
indicate that there is a lot of discussion and confusion about
the level of criticism not only in the established scientific
communities but also in foresight. Some use evidential and
some conceptual criticism, some even contain elements of
transformative criticism, like e.g., Bell (see 2.1). Hence, still
none of them has assigned their criteria to any type of scien-
tific validation as proposed by the different accounts of scien-
tific knowledge, although the social impact of futures research
has often been discussed. In other words, the foresight com-
munity establishes quality criteria but these have not yet been
discussed in a socio-epistemic framework, which differenti-
ates the diverse forms of scientific criticism.
Introducing foresight quality criteria
In the following, the criteria of transformative criticism devel-
oped by Longino are applied to the foresight quality criteria
for Futures Maps developed by Kuusi, Cuhls and Steinmüller
[12] in order to investigate if the criteria resist scientific criti-
cism on a socio-epistemic level.
The underlying understanding of a futures research
practice in this context is that a Futures Map is pro-
duced. A Futures Map is defined as Bthe comprehensive
description of the outcomes of a futures research pro-
cess. It comprises all relevant pictures of the future
identified during the process and all relations between
these pictures and between them and the present state as
well as assessments about time frames, desirability and
possibility of these pictures.^ [12]. The Futures Map is
then evaluated by five criteria of internal validity and
six criteria of external validity. For applying the quality
criteria the authors refer to the elements of a strategy
process in forward looking activities developed by
EFFLA [39] as : I) Strategic Intelligence, II) Sense
Making, III) Selecting Priorities and IV) Implementa-
tion. The five criteria for internal validity which are
adopted from EFFLA [39] are, condensed to questions,
as follows:
a) What is the objective of the whole foresight activity? Are
there hidden agendas?
b) What type of activity has to be considered for what type
of issues/time spans/ knowledge?
c) What is the scope of foresight? What is the scope of rel-
evant intelligence and sense making? Is there specific
strategic intelligence or are there sense-making projects
to be launched? How focused or wide should their scope
be?
d) What is an appropriate set of / combination of / methods
to make use of specific actors’ strategic intelligence? And
how can this be organized?
e) What are the intended outcomes of the different stages in
the process? In general, reports are written but often the
activity as such is an outcome. How are the results pre-
sented? [12] As can be seen, main issues are objectives,
scope and outcomes, but also the appropriateness of com-
bining methods and tools for specific tasks and involving
specific actors. These internal criteria for validation refer
mainly to the scientific method applied in a foresight pro-
ject. Thus, they question the rules applied in the process.
The Bsix pragmatic criteria of external validity of the fu-
tures map^ are the following:
Criterion 1 The number or the scope of possible futures
that might be relevant from the point of view
of the vision or acceptable futures.
Criterion 2 The most relevant or important possible fu-
tures are identified.
Criterion 3 All kinds of causally relevant facts are cov-
ered by the identified futures.
Criterion 4 Causally relevant facts are effectively
interpreted with as few scenarios as
possible.
Criterion 5 Many kinds of users of the Futures Map are
able to understand and use it.
Criterion 6 Key customers of the Futures Map are able
to understand and benefit from the Map
[12].
All these points imply that a debate is needed to validate
which is the more appropriate Futures Map for a certain
foresight practice aim or interest of a target group. From
an epistemic point of view, the debate can be seen as a
social one when arguing with Longino’s concept. Criteria
1–6 can be confronted with Longino’s criteria of transfor-
mative criticism.
So in a first step I will embed the quality criteria by Kuusi,
Cuhls and Steinmüller in the framework of scientific criticism
by highlighting where contextual values play a role. In a
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second step I will show that in regard of transformative criti-
cism, the quality criteria by Kuusi, Cuhls and Steinmüller
represent a comprehensive map of criterion 2 of Longino’s
transformative criticism, Shared Standards, but also respond
to the other criteria of transformative criticism.
Which form of scientific criticism do the foresight quality
criteria respond to?
Regarding the criteria suggested by Kuusi, Cuhls and
Steinmüller, we can identify all three levels of scientific crit-
icism as described by Longino. At a first glance, the criteria
suggested for internal validity ought to concentrate on proce-
dural aspects of a foresight activity. If these criteria aim at
describing only rules for foresight as an acceptable scientific
method, we would only have to deal with constitutive values
in this case. Accordingly, one can say that these criteria belong
to a validation by conceptual criticism. Scientific criticism on
an evidential basis can be applied by questioning the appro-
priateness of applied methods and data only in b). Questions
a) c) d) e) are partly situated between conceptual and intersub-
jective criticism. Criteria a) and d) for example focus on issues
which involve the role of specific actors and therefore have to
include the validation of contextual values. It can also be
argued that the particular question in c) BWhat is the scope
of relevant intelligence and sense-making?^ requires a closer
look at potential contextual values as it addresses relevancy.
Hence, these cases have to be assigned to conceptual criticism.
From this observation follows that from an epistemic point of
view there is still confusion within the five criteria for internal
validation, as it is not clearly limited to the process and applied
methods per se.
For the sake of clarity in foresight validation the distinction
between two forms of criteria makes sense: The internal criteria
focus on processes and the external validity criteria test if results
are supported by Bweak signals, etc. and well-established theo-
ries^ [12]. The criteria which Kuusi, Cuhls and Steinmüller
suggest for external validity shall lead to Bsound reasons to
generalize – or to make abduction – from past and present facts
to futures relevant conclusions.^ [12] Their emphasis on the
need for external validity reveals the intersubjective nature of
knowledge creation in futures research and the strong relation
of foresight to customers’ interests. It is possible to validate
these criteria as a social scientific endeavor for two reasons:
first, there is a strong focus on relevancy, which is a rather
intersubjective point, and the criteria intend to contextualize
outcomes with existing knowledge. Nevertheless, from a
socio-epistemic point of view based on Longino, the artificial
distinction into external and internal criteria appears to be re-
dundant, as the six criteria of external validation already seem
to cover all forms of criticism.
Kuusi, Cuhls and Steinmüller indicate that these six criteria
can be summarized in pairs as Bbasic dimensions in validity
evaluations^ and that there are B[…] connections between the
suggested criteria of external validity and the internal validity
of futures research processes.^ [12] As the first two criteria
cover the phase of Strategic Intelligence, we can assume that
we can apply criticism on the conceptual level within these
two first criteria. In order to respond to criteria 1 and 2 meth-
odological and procedural questions have to be answered, as
well. For example, conceptual criticism in this case would
correspond to the methodology choice for achieving the fore-
sight aim. Further, if this phase covers Strategic Intelligence,
one might also cover a) b) c) and partly d) from the internal
criteria in the first of the external ones as they also focus on
procedural aspects.
Still, an open point of discussion in this case is that criteria
1–4 emphasize relevance. Now, how is relevance understood
in this case? More clarification is needed in the description of
this criterion in order to evaluate if this point is possibly a case
for validation by conceptual criticism. At least, criteria 1 and 2
refer to relevance in terms of methodological and procedural
appropriateness and at the same time to their relevance for
the customer. Due to the latter point, there are contextual
values involved in these two criteria but also in the fol-
lowing two.
The second pair focuses on Sense Making in futures re-
search activities, which interprets the relevance of the out-
comes of Strategic Intelligence. They also define probable
futures based on facts of the past and depending on their
relevance to different scenarios [12]. Sense making and esti-
mating probabilities for future events is mainly a qualitative
process. Therefore, these steps are strongly influenced by con-
textual values. The appropriate form of criticism to validate
outcomes on these levels is the third form of conceptual crit-
icism, which includes intersubjective criticism. This is, e.g.,
the case when the appropriateness of a selected method is
discussed.
The last pair, criteria 5 and 6, B[…] are related to all stages
but they are especially important in the phases of Sense Mak-
ing and Selecting Priorities^ [12]. These criteria obviously
refer to contextual values involved in the process and are not
only to be taken into consideration of the third form of con-
ceptual criticism, but also need to be considered in terms of
transformative criticism. This pair of criteria indicates that the
intersubjective and value-laden character of outcomes in fore-
sight should actively be addressed in its validation. Hence,
transformative criticism supports the point that applying these
criteria can in fact be seen as an activity of scientific criticism
of foresight outcomes.
Do the quality criteria contribute to transformative
criticism?
As shown in the previous section, contextual values appear in
each step in foresight processes, so that quality criteria should
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be able to encompass them in their criticism. The criteria of
transformative criticism proposed by Longino may contribute
to more objectivity and credibility for the futures research
outcomes in the community.
For this case, the quality criteria by Kuusi, Cuhls and
Steinmüller can be seen as a major contribution to establishing
Shared Standards, the second criterion of transformative crit-
icism suggested by Longino. For example, in their paper the
authors contextualize their quality criteria with others, such as
EFFLA [39] or Gerhold et al. [8]. Further, the criteria have
been introduced to a peer review process in the form of a
conference methodology session at the World Conference of
Futures Research 2015. By this, a first step towards opening
the discussion on Recognized Avenues for Criticism was tak-
en, which is the first criterion for transformative criticism. A
continuous discussion of the appropriateness of the different
quality criteria is needed to establish a common understand-
ing. However, the concurrently formulation of different qual-
ity criteria also indicates that the process of reaching Shared
Standards in foresight quality criteria is at the very beginning.
Finally, the quality criteria 5 and 6 already indicate that the
authors see a need of validating foresight outcomes in regard
of their comprehensibility and relevance for lay people as well
as for experts. By these criteria the need for Community Re-
sponse, the third criterion of transformative criticism, which
would be applied to the quality criteria themselves, is also
integrated in the quality criteria for validating Futures Maps.
Hence, the quality criteria by Kuusi, Cuhls and Steinmüller do
not only take into account the questioning of contextual
values, but already involve some aspects of transformative
criticism themselves.
Discussing relations: quality criteria, objectivity
and relevance
After applying the quality criteria by Kuusi, Cuhls and
Steinmüller to a socio-epistemic framework of scientific crit-
icism, crucial points of discussion are the relations between
quality criteria, scientific objectivity and relevance. Thus, the
two main issues of foresight validation as formulated by
Kuusi, Cuhls and Steinmüller (see 2.1) are refocused:
BDoes the ‘whole picture’ meet scientific criteria? […]
Does the ‘whole picture’ serve their [the customers’ or
the target group of users’] interests? Is it relevant for
them?^ [12]
The first question refers to objectivity, while the second one
refers to relevance. If foresight is accepted as a socio-
epistemic venture due to its aims and procedures, there is a
base for investigating if different quality criteria also fulfill the
requirements of a socio-epistemic validation. As indicated by
matching the different forms of scientific criticism to the
criteria, we can conclude that they cover all forms of criticism
that is needed in order to establish objective processes and
outcomes when creating Futures Maps. The previous chapter
shows that the quality criteria suggested by Kuusi, Cuhls and
Steinmüller correspond to social epistemology concerning all
points, but also in regard of the distinction of internal and
external validity. However, the distinction between internal
and external validity suggested by Kuusi, Cuhls and
Steinmüller needs more accuracy as it might lead to confusion
in socio-epistemic discussions.
Seen epistemologically, the internal quality criteria ought to
represent the level of validity that refers to constitutive values
(referring to sound methodological procedures), while the ex-
ternal quality criteria amount to contextual values (referring to
personal or group values). But as indicated earlier, these attri-
butions are not clear enough as they are also used to distin-
guish the socio-epistemic view on knowledge creation from
traditional epistemology (see reference to Goldman in the in-
troduction). The epistemological question about internality
and externality encompasses the notion that justifications ei-
ther rely on facts to which the knowing one or individual has
access to (or: knowledge evolves from individuals justifying
their knowledge personally, also known as internalist position)
or on reasons to which the knowing individual does not nec-
essarily have to have access to (externalist position). Socio-
epistemic accounts mostly rely upon the externalist position
[17, 40]. In contrast, the distinction between internal and ex-
ternal validity in the quality criteria by Kuusi, Cuhls and
Steinmüller do not directly refer to the future knowledge cre-
ated, but to internal validity in forms of Bwell-organized pro-
cess[es]^ and Bpragmatic and organizational approaches^ and
to external validity in terms of sound reasons and relevant
conclusions. Hence, the criteria for external validity can be
seen as related to the future knowledge produced by
forward-looking activities. Therefore, when underpinning
foresight by social epistemology, a clear understanding of in-
ternal and external is needed.
The investigation of the epistemic base of the foresight
quality criteria by Longino’s socio-epistemic criteria allows
the following answer: The proof of objectivity can validate
the claim for scientific procedures. As shown, the six criteria
of external validity cover the aspects of transformative criti-
cism. They can therefore provide a scientific validation of
Futures Maps or future looking activities in general. But the
issue of relevance is rather answered indirectly. Relevance in
futures research does not only refer to relevance within the
scientific method – this can be validated alongside with ob-
jectivity. But relevance is also linked to the users’ interest, as
the aim of a specific Futures Map also depends on the aim the
customer or the user sets up. Thus, objectivity can serve as a
necessary but not sufficient issue for asserting the relevance of
special issues in the different steps of a foresight process or
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when validating FuturesMaps. The relevance addressed in the
external quality criteria 1–4 referring to procedural and meth-
odological issues can partly be validated by conceptual criti-
cism. But the issues of relevance depending on a) the adequa-
cy of the procedures and b) the decisions in the phases of
Sense Making and Setting Priorities for reaching the interests
of the target group or customer remain biased: One can try to
provide objectivity by transformative criticism and one can try
to reveal the contextual values that may impede the results.
Again, the decisions about relevance remain customer-
oriented rather than epistemology-oriented and therefore lack
a comprehensive epistemic validation.
Conclusion
One of the main challenges in foresight validation is the cre-
ation of quality criteria that meet the requirements of the dif-
ferent scientific disciplines involved in foresight processes.
Hereby, different overlapping but also conflicting scientific
aims and processes have to be taken into consideration. This
means that even if there were standardized quality criteria for
validation, the interdisciplinary character of foresight evokes a
vicious circle. On the one hand, input from different disci-
plines, groups and stakeholders is needed for open out-of-
the-box thinking for future projections but on the other it in-
evitably brings together different disciplines following differ-
ent ontologisms and scientific aims. The challenge for creating
quality criteria in foresight is to encompass all these different
ontologisms, processes and contextual values but also to state
explicitly the aim of foresight by an appropriate scientific
criticism that is understood by all parties involved.
With the detailed depiction of scientific practice, the levels
of criticism and the impact of values based on Longino’s the-
ory I tried to show the range of pitfalls which have to be taken
into consideration when creating quality criteria for foresight.
Quality criteria do not only have to provide evidential criti-
cism on the appropriateness of methods and data, but also
intersubjective criticism reflecting values and relevance. By
matching the quality criteria developed by Kuusi, Cuhls and
Steinmüller with the different forms of criticism, I tried to find
out if these criteria meet the requirements of scientific criti-
cism. In the case of objectivity and to reduce conflicts of
understanding regarding Binternal^ and Bexternal^ validity,
the structure of the quality criteria may profit from more pre-
cision, i.e., by integrating the internal criteria into the first pair
of external criteria. The external validity criteria have the po-
tential to cover all forms of scientific criticism needed: the
evidential, the conceptual and the transformative.
Further, I tried to show that transformative criticism is very
useful for validating the future knowledge produced in for-
ward looking activities as it encompasses all forms of scien-
tific criticism and still leaves space for foresight as a strongly
transformative and interdisciplinary field to establish scientific
standards. The criteria of transformative criticism especially
that of Shared Standards, also shows that the various activities
in the futures community aiming at formulating quality
criteria indicate more objectivity in the field. Hence, socio-
epistemic criteria for scientific criticism may help to frame
the epistemic foundation of foresight by respecting its partic-
ular practices and aims.
The case of quality criteria formulation helps the socio-
epistemic justification and vice versa. Applying the socio-
epistemic framework to the foresight quality criteria also
showed that main issues, e.g., those of Community Response,
are already considered in the quality criteria. Hence, the inqui-
ry in this paper also supports the socio-epistemic position of
science as social knowledge not only by the strong influence
of contextual values in foresight, but also by the active debate
on quality criteria as transformative criticism of the foresight
community itself.
Another remaining question for further research will be to
examine whether it is more appropriate to apply the socio-
epistemic view to quality criteria or to specific futures
methods themselves. Further work may also consist of apply-
ing transformative criticism to other sets of quality criteria and
should also take into consideration other theories indicating
socio-epistemic frameworks of science, e.g., Philipp Kitcher’s
theory [15].
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